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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a seven-year-old Golden Retriever, named Goldie, 
has been an adopted part of the Jones family. She is an integrated 
family member, spending evenings with the human members and 
often going out with them on walks or trips. One day she is out 
barking in the front yard and a neighbor gets upset at the noise, 
calls her over, and stabs her five times with a knife; she staggers 
over to her yard and dies within minutes. Thirty minutes later she is 
discovered dead by the 16-year-old daughter of the family. The 
family sues the neighbor for damages, which consist of loss of 
companionship, comfort and affection. What damages are actually 
recoverable? Today, in a majority of states, the Jones family could 
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recover only the fair market value of Goldie at the time of the 
incident, perhaps the $200 adoption fee, at best.1 
The nominal recovery available for the loss of a companion 
animal such as Goldie doesn't sit well with many people. That is 
because people are increasingly viewing their companion animals 
less like property, as they are classified in the law, and more like 
members of the family. When someone kills one of the members of a 
family unit, it is a harm recognized at common law under the 
umbrella of loss of consortium.2 This cause of action, which initially 
recognized only the economic part of family relationships, has 
expanded over the past one hundred years to include the social 
aspect of relationships between humans.3 But the umbrella of 
consortium can expand further. It is the proposal of this article that 
a new cause of action for the intentional killing of a companion 
animal become available: animal consortium. 
The existing tort of loss of consortium doctrine needs to be 
expanded to include those companion animals who have increasingly 
become integral parts of our emotional and physical families. While 
the term family traditionally speaks in term of "persons" living 
together under one roof, 4 today, many individuals self-define family 
to include their companion animals. 5 If it can be accepted that four-
legged beings are part of the family, at least for some individuals, 
then the public policy underlying loss of consortium should also 
support recovery for the intentional killing of a companion animal. 
This article will show that sufficient relational interest can exist 
between a human and companion animal and that this interest is 
widely accepted in our culture; therefore, financial recovery for the 
disruption of this relationship is a fair burden to place upon actors in 
today's world.6 This proposal does not seek to give any legal rights to 
companion animals; instead, this is a proposal to allow the law to 
acknowledge the depth and reality of the bond between humans and 
animals that exists in millions of families across the country. 
1. See Pewr Barton & Frances Hill, How Much Will You Receive in Damages 
from the Negligent or Intentional Killing of Pet Dog or Cat, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
411, 411 (1989). 
2. This t,erm was defined by a modern Ohio Supreme Court: "Consortium 
includes services, society, companionship, comfort, love and solace." Gallimore v. 
Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ohio 1993). 
3. See discussion infra in Section III.a .. 
4. Family, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968). 
5. See discussion infra Section III.f .. 
6. Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 843 (N.M. 1994) (holding liability is limit,ed 
by the "foreseeability of harm" to a close relationship). 
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First, this article sets out the existing categories of damage for 
recovery when a defendant's tortious actions result in the death of a 
companion animal. 7 Integral to this discussion is the reality that 
companion animals are considered property.s Courts most often are 
unwilling to extend financial recovery to include the emotional loss 
of the owner of an animal. 9 Second, this article will examine the 
history of the concept of consortium to show how the legal system 
has come to accept that the compensable harm is not limited to 
economic consequences, nor is it limited to husband and wife 
relationships.IO Third, this article will present information to 
support the position that companion animals are emotionally and 
psychologically important to the human members of many families.11 
Fourth, this article will show that animals have already jumped out 
of the property box in a number of fact patterns, and therefore, it is 
appropriate to raise their status in this context as well. 12 Fifth, this 
article will consider the application of the concept of animal 
consortium in detail as an extension of the common law cause of 
action. 13 Finally, acknowledging some of the difficulties that courts 
may have in implementing this proposal, a legislative draft is 
proposed to accomplish the recovery sought by this article. 14 
I. PRESENT STATE OF DAMAGE CLAIMS FOR HARM To COMPANION 
ANIMALS 
The extent of recovery for harm to a companion animal will 
depend first upon the cause of action utilized, and second, upon the 
scope of damages allowed under that cause of action. Today, -suits 
arising out of the loss of a companion animal might be brought as 
claims of negligent or intentional destruction of personal property, 
7. See discussion infra Part II. 
8. See Marcella S. Roukas, Determining the Value of Companion Animals in 
Wrongful Harm or Death Claims: A Survey of U.S. Decisions and an Argument for 
the Authorization to Recover for Loss of Companionship in Such Cases, ANIMAL 
LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2007), https://www.animallaw.info/article/determining-value-
companion-animals-wrongful-harm-or-death-claims-survey-us-decisions-and. 
9. See Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death 
Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for 
Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 218-21 (2003). 
10. See discussion infra Sections 111.a.-b .. 
11. See discussion infra Section 111.d .. 
12. See discussion infra Section III.f.. 
13. See discussion infra Section IV.a .. 
14. See discussion infra Section IV.b.--c .. 
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negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, or the 
violation of a civil right. 
The most common cause of action is for the negligent or 
intentional destruction of personal property; however, as will be 
shown, there are other causes of action available with different 
measures of damages being used by the courts.15 Before focusing on 
the new proposal, this article will contextualize the need for animal 
consortium by explaining the limitations of existing torts. 
A. Destruction of Property 
Time and time again plaintiffs file lawsuits to seek recovery for 
the negligent or intentional injury or death of a companion animal.16 
The present state of the law is unsatisfactory in that there is a 
disconnect between the public perception of the value of companion 
animals and the recovery allowed by state supreme courts. 17 For 
example, under criminal law, the intentional killing of a neighbor's 
cat may result in a felony conviction and serious jail time, but in a 
large majority of jurisdictions, the cat killer would be liable at civil 
law only for the market value of the cat.18 
This problem arises because all domestic animals, even 
companion dogs and cats, have historically been categorized as 
personal property19, and the damages allowed at common law for 
harm to property is the reduction in market value caused by the 
harm.20 With the exception of some purebred animals and animals 
15. See Roukas, supra note 8. 
16. See Byszewski, supra note 9, at 218-21; Sabrina DeFabritijs, Barking Up 
the Wrong Tree: Companion Animals, Emotional Damages and the Judici,ary's 
Failure to Keep Pace, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 244 (2012); Zachary Paterick, 
Timothy Paterick & Sandy Sanbar, A Stepping Stone Toward Companion Animal 
Protection Through Compensation, 22 ANIMAL L. 79, 88-89 (2015). 
17. The Washington Post spoke with people in a dog park in Northern Virginia 
to inquire what monetary value they would put on their pet. A common answer was 
"priceless." Monica Akhtar, Property or priceless: What is the value of a pet?, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 13, 2016), http://wapo.st11TPjiFz. 
18. See Roukas, supra note 8 ("In line with most states, a decision out of 
Georgia held that the value of an animal could be proved using the market value, 
including certain qualities such as the particular breed.") (citing Columbus R. Co. v. 
Woolfolk, 128 Ga. 631 (1907)). 
19. Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 531, 533 (1998). See generally Adam P. Karp & Margrit Lent Parker, 
Recent Developments in Animal Tort and Insurance Law, 51 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 245 (2016) (providing summary of cases from 2015). 
20. See Dillon v. O'Connor, 412 P.2d 126, 128 (Wash. 1966) ("[I]t is error to 
instruct the jury that [dogs] have a value in [a]ddition to 'fair market value."'). 
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with special training, most companion animals have near zero 
market value, or such reduced value so as to make the employment 
of the legal system impractical for recovery for the economic loss.21 
Some early cases allowed for a more expansive list of damages to 
include recovery for emotion or pain and suffering by the owners,22 
and a number of trial and intermediate appeals courts have allowed 
more extensive damages for the plaintiffs.23 However, over the past 
twenty years, state supreme courts have consistently rejected 
attempts to expand either the cause of action available beyond the 
destruction of property or the claim of damages to humans when 
their companion animals have been harmed, except for a few 
allowing reasonable veterinarian cost. 24 
For example, in Texas, a plaintiff sought damages in an action 
against an employee of an animal shelter, alleging that the employee 
negligently euthanized their dog; damages were denied by the trial 
court, allowed by the court of appeals, but denied by the Supreme 
Court of Texas.25 The same result occurred in a Vermont case.26 
Although the court understood what was being asked, the court was 
unwilling to extend relief for noneconomic damages: 
Absent persuasive precedent, plaintiffs propose that this 
Court extend the common law to recognize a new cause of 
21. &e Kelch, supra note 19, at 533. 
22. For example, a Florida case allowed mental suffering recovery for malicious 
destruction of an animal when a trash collector threw a trash can at the companion u 
animal. La Porte v. Assoc. Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1964). But see 
Kennedy v. Agape Animal Hosp., 867 So.2d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(distinguishing itself from the prior case as wrongdoing was negligence, not an 
intentional act). 
23. For example, in 2016, for the death of three dogs, a jury in Oregon awarded 
the plaintiff: $7,500 for replacement value; $100,000 in emotional harm; and 
$139,500 in punitive damages. Clark v. Johnson, No. 13CV07246, 2016 WL 2653227, 
at *1 (Or. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2016). The defendants intentionally shot three sheep guard 
dogs while out in the woods when the dogs responded to the defendants' use of an elk 
call. Id. See also Kelly Fisicaro, Civil Verdict Reached on Livestock Dogs Killed in 
2012, THE BULLETIN (Mar. 11, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.bendbulletin. 
com/localstate/4101654-151/civil-verdict-reached-on-livestock-dogs-killed-in 
(providing an account of what happened in case cited above). 
24. &e Roukas, supra note 8. 
25. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 191-92 (Tex. 2013) ("Therefore, like 
courts in the overwhelming majority of other states, the Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, and the other Texas courts of appeals that have considered this question, we 
reject emotion-based liability and prohibit recovery for loss of the human-animal 
bond.") (footnotes omitted). 
26. Scheele v. Dustin, 998 A.2d 697, 702-03 (Vt. 2010) (citations omitted) 
(citing State v. LeBlanc, 540 A.2d 1037, 1040 (Vt. 1987)). 
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action for the wrongful killing of a pet dog. While this Court 
has and will "change the common law to meet changing 
needs of the people of this state," we also recognize instances 
where the issue presented "is better left for legislative 
resolution." Plaintiffs have expressly requested any new 
cause of action be limited to pet dogs, yet beyond a blanket 
statement that "dogs love you back" and citation to numerous 
cultural artifacts, they give no basis for such an arbitrary 
limitation. As in Goodby, here "[p]laintiffs fail to demonstrate 
a compelling reason why, as a matter of public policy, the law 
should offer broader compensation for the loss of a pet than 
would be available for the loss of a friend, relative, work 
animal, heirloom or memento-all of which can be prized 
beyond measure, but for which this state's law does not 
recognize recovery for sentimental loss. 21 
As mentioned earlier, a few jurisdictions, while still denying 
noneconomic damages, do allow for more than loss of market value 
by allowing the cost of attempts to repair the "property," usually in 
the form of reasonable veterinary costs, to be considered by the jury. 
In 2016, a case from the Supreme Court of Georgia stated the 
following: 
[I]n addition to recovering the fair market value of their 
deceased dog plus interest, the Monyaks would be entitled to 
recover the reasonable veterinary [costs] and other expenses 
they reasonably incurred in trying to save her. Whether the 
veterinary costs and other expenses incurred by a pet owner 
in obtaining treatment for an animal negligently injured by 
another are reasonable will depend on the facts of each 
case.28 
The same result was reached by the Massachusetts Appeals Court in 
a case involving tortious injury to a dog.29 
27. Scheele, 998 A.2d at 703 (quoting Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269, 
1274 (Vt. 2009)). 
28. Barking Hound Village, LLC v. Monyak, 787 S.E.2d 191, 198-99 (Ga. 2016). 
29. See Irwin v. Degtiarov, 8 N.E.3d 296, 301 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014). The court 
stated: 
Among the factors to be considered are the type of animal involved, the 
severity of its injuries, the purchase and/or replacement price of the animal, 
its age and special traits or skills, its income-earning potential, whether it 
was maintained as part of the owner's household, the likelihood of success 
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Despite the willingness of some courts to allow recovery of 
reasonable veterinary costs in destruction of property claims, such 
recovery still does not compensate the owner of the companion 
animal for their emotional suffering. A different set of damages-
noneconomic damages-may be available under different causes of 
action. Noneconomic damages might exist if the focus can shift from 
the property context toward the personal rights context. 
B. Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Historically a cause of action has always existed for negligent 
destruction of property; however, almost no court is comfortable with 
:recognizing the t.ort of negligent infliction of pain and suffering arising 
out of harm t.o property, such as companion animal, as a new cause of 
action. For example, consider this statement of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia: "Accordingly, for clarification purposes, 
we now hold_ that dogs are personal property and damages for 
sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are not 
recoverable for the negligently inflicted death of a dog."30 The same 
result occurred in an opinion written by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.31 The courts do not allow the creation of this cause of action, 
specifically because it would necessitate a consideration of human-
focused, noneconomic harm. 
Consider also Connecticut: In Vaneck v. Drew, a lower 
Connecticut court found that a companion animal relationship is of a 
close enough kind and degree to satisfy the traditional "close 
relationship prong" of an negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claim for bystander liability where the plaintiff heard the "thud" of 
defendant's car hitting and killing plaintiffs dog, Shadow, while the 
defendant was driving negligently.32 In contrast with the Vaneck 
case, a prior Connecticut court opinion stated that a relationship 
with a dog was not a close relationship.33 Thus, a split of authority 
exists within the state and has not been resolved by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court. 
of the medical procedures employed, and whether the medical procedures 
involved are typical and customary to treat the injuries at issue. 
Id. at 301. 
30. Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W.Va. 2005). 
31. Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 802 (Wis. 2001). 
32. Vaneck v. Cosenza-Drew, No. MMXCV085003942S, 2009 WL 1333918, at 
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2009). 
33. Coston v. Reardon, No. 063892, 2001 WL 1467610, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 18, 2001). 
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While the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is 
available in most jurisdictions, 34 the requirements of the tort are 
usually not met in the death or injury of a pet. Bringing an intention 
infliction of emotional distress claim is attractive to those who suffer 
the loss of a companion animal because the tort usually allows for 
punitive damages.35 When punitive damages are available, they can 
result in substantial damage awards. 
Unfortunately for persons with companion animals, a key 
requirement is that the actor must have an intention to harm the 
human plaintiff by intending to cause the plaintiff emotional 
distress.36 The intent element is typically not satisfied by an intent 
to harm the companion animal. For instance, a Wisconsin court was 
not willing to expand the scope of the tort, continuing to require that 
the intention of the actor must be to cause harm to the plaintiff, not 
to the animal. 37 In contrast, a Washington court did allow an 
expanded application of the tort, focusing on whether the harm to 
the animal was intentional and grievous.38 
C. Violation of a Civil Right 
Two recent cases represent a more creative and flexible approach 
in the awarding of noneconomic damages. This more creative 
approach occurs when the courts leave the world of property and 
enter the world of individual civil rights. 
The constitutional right claim arises as a Section 1983 action 
under the federal Civil Rights Act.39 The basic purpose of a§ 
1983 damage award is to compensate persons for injuries caused by 
the deprivation of their constitutional rights. 40 A 2016 opinion in 
Michigan clarified that this purpose applied where government 
agents shot the plaintiffs' dog while performing government 
functions. 41 In rejecting the position of the defendant that damages 
should be limited to the Michigan view of the dog's property value, 
the court allowed that damages could be much broader: 
34. Catherine Palo, Proof of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 136 
AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 175 § 1 (2013). 
35. See id. at§ 45 (citing Washington v. California City Correction Center, 871 
F. Supp. 2d 1010 (E.D. Cal. 2012)). 
36. See id. at § 15 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIBD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 46). 
37. Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 803. 
38. Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
40. Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1982). 
41. Moreno v. Hughes, 157 F. Supp. 3d 687, 688 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
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Defendant argues that this matter is akin to the negligence 
action in Koester, and that this is purely a property rights 
case; however such an argument is unpersuasive because the 
case herein is a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure case 
under § 1983. The federal common law of damages in § 
1983 cases was developed with specific policy rationales that 
are not implicated in negligence actions. Other courts have 
acknowledged that "the private Fourth Amendment interests 
involved are appreciable," that "the bond between a dog 
owner and his pet can be strong and enduring," and some 
"think of dogs solely in terms of an emotional relationship, 
rather than a property relationship." .... 
. .. Prohibiting recovery for emotional damages stemming 
from the loss of, or harm to, an animal caused by a 
constitutional violation would conflict with the compensatory 
and deterrence aims of§ 1983 .... Here, if the Court were to 
preclude mental and emotional damages attributable to the 
constitutional violation, including the unlawful seizure of 
Plaintiffs' dog, Plaintiffs will not be compensated for their 
"actual losses." Thus, this Court must apply the federal 
common law and award emotional distress damages arising 
from Defendant's unlawful seizure of Plaintiffs' dog.42 
901 
Similarly, in the Maryland case of Brooks v. Jenkins, the court 
held that an officer acted with gross negligence when he shot a 
companion animal while seeking to serve an arrest warrant at a 
private residence.43 The court upheld a jury verdict for $7,500, as 
capped under Maryland statute for economic harm and veterinary 
expenses,« as well as $100,000 for violation of the Maryland 
constitutional right prohibiting the state from taking property 
without due process of law.45 In allowing the latter award to stand, 
the court held that the statutory cap only applied to the damage to 
the plaintiffs property interest in the animal and did not foreclose 
other categories of damages.46 In this case, the actions of the officer 
created a constitutional tort, one deserving separate consideration 
42. Id. at 689-90 (quoting Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 205 (4th 
Cir. 2003)) (internal citation reference omitted). 
43. Brooks v. Jenkins, 104 A.3d 899, 909-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014). 
44. Id. at 910-15 (interpreting MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-110 
(West 2013)) . 
45. Id. at 916-18, n. 20 (applying MD. CONST. art. XIV). 
46. Id. at 916-18. 
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by the jury.47 The court did not address how a jury could arrive at 
the amount of a $100,000 award for each of the two plaintiffs.48 
The primary limitation of the civil rights cause of action is that 
the actor must be an agent of the government when the event 
occurs.49 Thus, there can be two very different jury awards for the 
death of companion animal depending upon whether the bad actor is 
a neighbor or a local police officer. This discrepancy does not seem 
appropriate and the adoption of animal consortium as a cause of 
action will allow for more consistent outcomes. 
II. CONSORTIUM - Loss OF SOCIETY 
A. History of Consortium Actions 
The history of property rights and non-economic damages 
surrounding the doctrine of loss of consortium is as tumultuous as it 
is interesting. Under United States common law of coverture, which 
was adopted from British common law, a wife used to be considered 
the personal property of a husband as part of the coverture system. 50 
The British common law of coverture, in turn, evolved out of the 
feudal law system of the middle ages.51 Under the common law of 
coverture, a wife was her husband's chattel, and she could not own 
property, earn a salary, or enter into contracts.52 Additionally, 
following marriage, a woman lost her status a feme sole, and she was 
not a citizen of any state; instead, she was held by her husband.53 
47. The court distinguished the property claim from the constitutional claim: 
But nothing about CJ § 11-110 vitiated their existing right to recover, on 
appropriate proof, whatever non-pet damages they could prove, including 
their noneconomic damages, for the Deputy's grossly negligent violation of 
their constitutional rights. Put another way, if the Deputy's bullet had 
missed Brandi, entered the house, and hit an expensive china vase sitting 
on the mantle, there would be no doubt that the Jenkinses could recover the 
economic and noneconomic damages they could prove. Because pets are 
property, CJ§ 11-110 defines their property value, but it cannot rationally 
be read to cabin a grossly negligent official's total liability based on the 
fortuity that he shot a pet rather than something inanimate. 
Id. at 914. 
48. Id. at 911. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
50. &e John E. Hannigan, Damages Recoverable by Husband for Injury to Wife, 
16 COLUM. L. REV. 122, 123 (1916). 
51. Id. at 122-25. 
52. Id. at 125. 
53. Id. at 132. &e 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 442 ("By 
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
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In the 1800s, any personal and real property that a wife owned 
or acquired belonged to the husband.54 The bundle of rights a 
husband was given upon taking a wife in marriage was robust and 
included the sole right to sue for damages to a wife's possessions.55 
An 1823 case demonstrates this principle and captures the attitude 
of the day: 
The dwelling-house, and all the goods and chattels purchased 
or owned by the wife, belonged to the husband, and for an 
injury done to that property the husband alone must sue. 
This doctrine is too well settled to be controverted; and it is 
not necessary to support it by reference to authority.56 
Loss of consortium claims first developed to allow a husband to seek 
recompense after tortious injury to his wife left her unable to 
perform the household duties and services she would have performed 
prior to her injury.57 Initially, the focus was upon the economic value 
of the wife's services. 58 
The claim subsequently evolved to allow a husband to also 
recover damages for the loss of sexual congress and 
companionship.59 Additionally, in the 17th and early 18th centuries, 
a husband could sue for loss of consortium for an injury or 
kidnapping of his daughter, because of the "comfort and delight he 
has in [her], [and] his anxiety for [her] loss."60 During this period in 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated 
and consolidated into that of husband .... " (footnotes omitted)). 
54. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. 
55. Moores v. Carter, 17 F. Cas. 714, 714 (Terr. Ark. Super. Ct. 1828). 
56. Id. (holding that a wife had no right to join her husband's lawsuit for 
damages to her personal possessions when the husband and wife were separated and 
bandits had broken into the wife's dwelling and stolen her chests of goods). 
57. John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful 
Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-
Century Family, 25 L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 715, 723-24 (2000). 
58. This economic focus was suggested by Lord Coke in the case of Guy v. 
Livesey, when he reported the action being "[a]s the master shall have for the loss of 
his servant's service." Guy v. Livesey, Cro. Jae., 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1619). See also 3 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 140 (citing Livesey, 79 Eng. Rep. 428): 
[B]ut if the beatings [of the wife] or other maltreatment be very enormous, 
so that thereby the husband is deprived for any time of the company and 
assistance of his wife, the law then gives him a separate remedy by an 
action upon the case for this ill-usage, per quod consortium amisit, in which 
he shall recover a satisfaction in damages. 
59. See, e.g., Lane v. Steiniger, 156 N.W. 375, 376 (Iowa 1916). 
60. Kirkpatrick v. Lockhart, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 276, 278 (1809). 
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time, some courts used different language such as "loss of his wife's 
society" to discuss the doctrine ofloss of consortium.61 
The evolution of the loss of consortium doctrine followed a 
similar but delayed trajectory for women. First, the courts allowed a 
wife to bring a claim for economic loss occurring from a tortious 
injury to her husband, and then, decades later, for loss of love, sex, 
and companionship.62 In 1839, Mississippi passed the Married 
Women's Property Act, giving women the right to own real and 
personal property apart from their husbands. 63 This statute marked 
a historic turning point for women's rights, American history, and 
the expansion of the loss of consortium doctrine. Eventually every 
state adopted a version of Women's Property Act, and the courts 
soon began to recognize a loss of consortium claim for wives that 
partially corresponded to the claim that husbands already had for 
tortious injury to their wives.64 However, the early loss of consortium 
claims brought by wives only permitted their recovery for economic 
losses that they suffered as a result of their husbands' inability to 
work. In an 1889 case, Thomas u. Dansby, the court held that Mrs. 
Thomas could sue for the loss of economic support she suffered when 
her husband had his leg tortiously broken while he was drunk at a 
saloon, leaving him unable to work or provide for her for three 
months after the injury.65 
More than fifty years after the law first recognized a wife's claim 
for economic losses due to tortious injury to her husband, the loss of 
consortium doctrine was again expanded to recognize the loss of love, 
companionship, happiness, and sex that a wife suffers when her 
husband is tortiously injured or killed. In the 1950 case Hitaffer v. 
Argonne Co., the court rejected the longstanding argument that a 
wife had no reciprocal claim to loss of love, companionship, and sex 
that husbands had long enjoyed and held that a wife has a 
derivative claim for loss of consortium when her husband is 
61. Steiniger, 156 N.W. at 376. 
62. See Richard Joslyn, Wife's Right of Action for Loss of Consortium, 36 A.L.R. 
3d 900 (1971). 
63. 1839 Miss. Laws 920. The Act consists of only two paragraphs. The first 
provides for ownership of property regardless of marital status. The second deals 
with the ownership of slaves, specifically allowing women to have full ownership of 
them. 
64. Linda D. Elrod, Rights of Spouse, 1 KAN. L. & PRAC., FAMILY LAW § 8.28 
(2016) ("The enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts in the 19th century 
gave women the right to sue and be sued. Most courts then allowed a wife to 
maintain an action for loss of her husband's consortium."). 
65. Thomas v. Dansby, 41 N.W. 1088, 1090 (Mich. 1889). 
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negligently injured or killed.66 This case marks the point in history 
when the loss of consortium doctrine came to embody most of the 
tenants of loss of love, sex, and companionship for either spouse that 
people are familiar with today.67 Although the loss of consortium 
doctrine is mostly a judicially-created creature of common law, it has 
been codified by a number of state legislatures.68 For. example, the 
Tennessee provision simply states that "There shall exist in cases 
where such damages are proved by a spouse, a right to recover for 
loss of consortium."69 
B. Loss of Consortium Beyond Husband and Wife 
For decades after the courts recognized reciprocal rights for 
husband and wife to sue for loss of consortium, courts struggled to 
keep the doctrine of loss of consortium tied to marriage partners. 10 
Issues that frequently arose included whether unmarried partners 
in a cohabitating relationship should be afforded claims for loss of 
consortium,71 and whether a couple engaged to be married should 
have access to loss of consortium claims. 72 In some jurisdictions 
today, the loss of consortium doctrine has expanded far beyond the 
bond of marriage to encompass the loss of love, society, and 
companionship of tortiously injured or killed parents, children, 
siblings, and adult children. In these jurisdictions, the circle of 
recovery might best be referred to as the intimate family.73 
Courts have continued to push the parameters of the loss of 
consortium doctrine to acknowledge the value of various family· 
relationships, such as between parent and child. Although the 
doctrine of loss of consortium has been expanded in the majority of 
66. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
67. See generally id. 
68. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (West 2007); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/13-203 (West 1993); see generally Richard E. Kaye, Loss of Consortium in Parent-
Child Relationship, 131 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 187 (2013) Carolyn Kelly 
MacWilliam, Cause of Action for Loss of Marital Consortium, 24 CAUSES OF ACTION 
2D 427 (2017). 
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-1-106. 
70. &e Alisha M. Carhle, Like Family: Rights of Nonmarried Cohabitational 
Partners in Loss of Consortium Actions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 391, 392 (2005). 
71. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 584 (1988) (holding that cohabitating 
couples did not have the right to maintain a claim for loss of consortium). 
72. Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 169 (Me. 1980) (holding that a cause of 
action for loss of consortium does not exist where injury to the spouse occurred while 
the couple was engaged to be married). 
73. See Carlile, supra note 70, at 397-400. 
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U.S. jurisdictions to permit a parent to bring a cause of action for the 
tortious injury or death of a minor child, there are some holdouts: 
the Michigan Supreme Court followed an older view and refused to 
extend consortium rights to a mother for the negligent injury of her 
child in a 1988 case.74 In contrast, five years after the Michigan case, 
the Ohio Supreme Court decided not to follow the Michigan court 
and allowed an extension of the concept not only to give the parent a 
cause of action, but the minor child as well.75 Although most courts 
and scholarly articles refer to the claim as "loss of filial consortium" 
when it involves recovery for the damaged relationship between a 
parent and minor child, 76 a claim for loss of filial consortium remains 
under the umbrella of the doctrine of loss of consortium. 
The doctrine of loss of consortium has been expanded even 
further to allow a parent to bring a loss of consortium claim for the 
tortious injury or death of an adult child. In Masaki v. General 
Motors Corp., the Supreme Court of Hawaii allowed parents to bring 
a loss of consortium claim against General Motors when a 
manufacturing defect in a van caused the van to run over their 
twenty-eight-year-old son, leaving him a quadriplegic.77 
In 1998, the New Mexico Supreme Court set a national 
precedent by allowing a grandmother to bring a loss of consortium 
claim for the negligently inflicted death of her twenty-two-month-old 
granddaughter.78 The court emphasized the closeness of the 
grandmother's relationship to the granddaughter in reaching the 
holding, and rejected the opposition's argument that allowing the 
claim would lead to increased insurance costs and litigation. 79 The 
court also addressed the important issue of avoiding double recovery 
in overlapping damages between the loss of consortium claim and a 
wrongful death or personal injury claim.so The court stated that 
double recovery is not an issue because damages for consortium are 
damages for the plaintiffs emotional distress, and 
[h]er consortium injury arises from her unique relationship 
with the victim (and not her family title)[, and] ... [a]ny 
right to damages for [her] loss of consortium would have to be 
74. Sizemore v. Smock, 422 N.W.2d 666, 667 (Mich. 1988). 
75. Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1053-54. 
76. &e, e.g., id. 
77. Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 577 (Haw. 1989). 
78. Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774, 776, 782 (N.M. 1998). 
79. Id. at 783-84. 
80. Id. 
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for her loss of society and companionship that is uniquely 
and singularly felt by virtue of her loss of that relationship.Bl 
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In 2003, the New Mexico Supreme Court again expanded the 
availability of loss of consortium, this time to unmarried 
cohabitating partners who shared "intimate familial 
relationship[s]."82 In 2016, an Iowa court clarified that the cause of 
action was available for a child conceived at the time of the father's 
death but not yet born, once the child was born.ss 
On the heels of the previously discussed cases, the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals allowed parents and siblings alike to bring a loss of 
consortium claim for the wrongful death of twenty-five-year-old 
Adam Fitzjerrell, who was killed by a negligently-fired bullet from a 
police officer's service weapon.84 The court further articulated that 
the standard for who can bring a loss of consortium claim should be 
based on the quality and closeness of the relationship, established by 
the facts and not a legal definition establishing or rejecting one. 85 
The court set forth helpful guidelines and factors for determining 
who should be able to bring a loss of consortium claim based on the 
quality and closeness of the relationship: 
this Court should consider several factors including, but not 
limited to: duration of the relationship; mutual dependence; 
common contributions to a life together; shared experience; 
living in the same household; financial support and 
dependence; emotional reliance on each other; qualities of 
their day to day relationship; and the manner in which they 
related to each other in attending to life's mundane 
requirements. 86 
These nine factors currently provide the framework for the types of 
relationships a person can use to show support for bringing a loss of 
consortium claim in New Mexico. These factors can also be used to 
make an exceedingly compelling argument about the existence of the 
companion animal bond that humans have with their dog or cat. 
With the umbrella of the doctrine of loss of consortium already 
expanded to cover various filial relationships, it seems natural to 
81. Id. at 782-83. 
82. Lowya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 957 (N.M. 2003). 
83. Estate of Gray v. Baldi, 880 N.W.2d 451, 452-53 (Iowa 2016). 
84. Fitzjerrell v. City of Gallup, 79 P.3d 836, 838, 841 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). 
85. Id. at 841. 
86. Id. at 840 (citing L-Ozoya, 66 P.3d at 955). 
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incorporate companion animals into the doctrine as well. The 
property status of animals should not be considered a hindrance to 
the application of the doctrine to companion animals. At the 
beginning of the doctrine, both wives and children did not possess 
full legal rights and were considered the property of the husband.87 
Yet the doctrine has evolved to allow both the wife and the child to 
have the right of consortium as their legal status transformed into 
full personhood. As the courts began to allow wives and then others 
access to this cause of action, it was an important part in the 
transformation of their legal status. Likewise, allowing an animal 
consortium cause of action by courts will be a real step in the legal 
transformation of the status of animals into living property.88 While 
this article does not suggest that any legal rights should be given to 
companion animals, the importance of the bond should be recognized 
by giving their human owners a cause of action. 
C. Limiting the Scope of Animal Consortium Claims 
Before proceeding any further, the limitations of animal 
consortium should be set out. This article does not seek to establish 
equality of position with humans for companion animals. Rather, a 
more limited form of consortium is suggested as a necessary and 
justifiable middle ground. As explained below, animal consortium is 
intended to cover only intentional harm for death, not injuries, and 
does not seek to be a step toward awarding the animal any damages 
in the form of wrongful death. These limitations are a logical 
starting point from a practical implementation and a public policy 
standpoint. 
Proposing a tort expansion necessarily requires a balancing of 
the importance of the harm against the imposition of the duty on the 
actors. How significant might this duty be in financial terms? How 
foreseeable is the harm to the human actors? How egregious must be 
the conduct? Among the problems forestalling inclusion of negligence 
in a claim for animal consortium is the foreseeability of damages 
resulting from a tortfeasor's negligence. The law has already 
concluded that if a tortfeasor is negligently operating a SUV and 
strikes and kills a man, then it is foreseeable that damages may be 
87. See supra Section III.A (discussing the history of consortium actions). 
88. See generally David Favre, Living Property: A New Legal Status for 
Animals Within the Legal System, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021 (2010). 
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done to that man's wife.89 Extending the same rationale, however, to 
argue that it is foreseeable that negligently striking a dog with an 
SUV will cause damages to the dog's owner, does not seem prudent 
at this time. On the other hand, if a person intentionally kills a 
companion animal, it should be foreseeable to the actor that there is 
a human connected to that animal and that a high risk of non-
economic damages exists to the humans who are the companions to 
the killed animal. 
The historical derivation of loss of consortium allowed recovery 
for injury, not just the death, of a spouse.90 This difference resulted 
because injury could well cause the real loss of income or services to 
the other spouse. Injury to a companion animal will not result in the 
loss of income or services.91 The injured companion animal will still 
be available to perform the emotional and social activities that it did 
before. While fact patterns may vary, this cause of action should be 
allowed where there is objective evidence of the loss of consortium. 
The . injury of. a companion animal might well strengthen the 
consortium bonds. The death of the animal is objective evidence that 
there has been a severance of the relationship. 
Finally, this expansion of consortium is not meant to support a 
death claim on behalf of the killed animal. To continue with the 
above example of a negligent SUV driver striking and killing a man, 
the man's estate would have a direct claim of wrongful death, or in a 
case where he was severely injured, he would have a personal injury 
claim; the wife would have a separate derivative claim for loss of 
consortium.92 This distinction highlights how uniquely suited the 
loss of consortium doctrine is for acknowledging damages of this 
sort. Dogs and cats will not have a wrongful death action, but the 
human will have the derivative claim for loss of consortium. 
D. Who is Family Within the Law? 
Accepting that the concept of consortium has the potential to 
expand and include new categories of individuals, various 
jurisdictions, such as New Mexico, have expanded the circle defined 
89. See generally Jo-Anne M. Baio, Loss of Consortium: A Derivative Injury 
Giving Rise to a Separate Cause of Action, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1344 (1982). 
90. See Carlile, supra note 70, at 395. 
91. There is one clear exception to this broad statement. Service animals who 
perform a specific task for a member of the family could have this function 
interrupted with an injury. An exception allowing recovery under animal consortium 
for serious injury to an animal would be justified. 
92. See generally Baio, supra note 89. 
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as "family."93 But what is a family? Family is defined in many 
different contexts such as religious precepts, state law, and personal 
beliefs. It is important in the legal world as a special status given to 
people. For example, it can shape the tax return filed with the 
Internal Revenue Service. Also, the term "single family homes" is 
omnipresent in zoning codes across the United States and 
determines where and with whom you live.94 Historically, a family 
might be considered the simple heterosexual couple with genetic 
offspring. In a 1977 case about zoning, the Supreme Court held that 
the term "family" could not be held to this narrow definition and 
must allow for an extended definition that would include 
grandmothers. 95 
In the past, the natural method of human reproduction limited 
the term family, but medical technology has forced a much more 
robust definition about who is a parent and when the relationship 
exists.96 The DNA of three humans can be combined to produce one 
child.97 Who are the parents? Now, children can be born after the 
death of a sperm donor.98 There are also issues about surrogate 
mothers and when they might be considered family. 
A 2015 U.S. Supreme Court opinion which held that states could 
not discriminate against same-sex couples appears to sever the legal 
and constitutional definition of family from the Christian religious 
definition which long existed in this country.99 Even the idea that a 
child can have only two parents has been stretched into a new 
93. See Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 776, 782. 
94. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the 
Right to Choose Household Companions, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1401, 1407-09 (2015) 
(discussing two key Supreme Court opinions that deal with the definition of family: 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) and Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)). 
95. Moore, 431 U.S. at 496-97, 505-06 (setting aside a zoning statute definition 
limiting the ability of a grandmother to live in the same house with grandchildren 
from her different children). 
96. See generally Cynthia E. Tobisman, The Post-Nuclear Family: Changing 
Definitions of What Constitutes a Familial Relationship, STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY 
LAW IN CALIFORNIA (2016). 
97. Tina Hesman Saey, 'Three-Parent lkibies' Explained, SCI. NEWS (Oct. 18, 
2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/three-parent-babies-explained. 
Besides the usual sharing of DNA from the father and mother, the egg of the mother 
also has a small set of separate mitochondrial DNA, which has now been shown to be 
replaceable with DNA from another woman. Id. Thus, the DNA of three humans 
combine for the creation of one human child. Id. 
98. See generally Margaret Ward Scott, Comment, A Look at the Rights and 
Entitlements of Posthumously Conceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame the 
Reproductive Wild West, 52 EMORYL.J. 963 (2003). 
99. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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dimension. For example, California family law now specifically 
allows for a child to have more than two legal parents.100 There are 
even articles promoting the position that the determination of family 
is personal and private, can consist of multiple adults, and should be 
respected by the state.101 
Clearly, the traditional boundaries of the term "family" no longer 
exist, and the law is in the midst of redefining the boundaries of the 
term. This article does not seek to engage in any constitutional 
analysis about the definition of family, but instead considers the 
term in the context for common law torts as might be modified by 
statute. The following material will show that many individual 
humans, or related groups of humans, by self-determination, have 
now expanded their definition of family, in particular intimate 
family, to include companion animals. Intimate family is about 
living together, sharing daily life, committing to the other members, 
and growing through shared responsibilities and benefits. This 
article asks that the law acknowledge the reality of these individual 
decisions about family by allowing damages for harm to family 
members when the appropriate intimate relationship can be shown 
to exist, perhaps using the test set out by the New Mexico Supreme 
Court described above.102 
E. Scientific Support for the Human-Animal Bond 
Domesticated dogs are descendants of the grey wolf.103 The grey 
wolf has a highly evolved and sophisticated social structure. 104 
Consequently, wolves were "ripe for adaptation to a life with· 
mankind."105 As wolves turned into dogs, they developed two 
adaptations.106 They developed a tolerance for other dogs, unlike 
wolves who "are aggressive towards all but the members of their own 
pack," and they "gained a unique sensitivity towards human body 
language, gaze and gesture."107 A dog's attachment to his or her 
100. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7601(West2014). 
101. See generally J. Boone Dryden, This Is the Family I Chose: Broadening 
Domestic Partnership Law to Include Polyamory, 36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 162 
(2015). 
102. See Fitzjerrell, 79 P.3d at 840. 
103. John Bradshaw, The Bond Between Pet and Owner, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 
19, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/pets-and-their-people/201211/the-
bond-between-pet-and-owner. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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owner is "fundamental to [his or her] well-being."108 A dog's affinity 
towards his or her owner can also be observed in the dog's anxiety 
and consternation at his or her owner's absence. 
Society's increased affinity for their companion animals is in part 
the result of companion animals' move indoors. In the not so distant 
past, it was common for pets to remain outdoors. However, recent 
developments in veterinary medicine have effectively eradicated 
companion animal parasites, which used to deter people from 
housing their companion animals inside.109 These advancements 
have fundamentally changed the way people live and bond with 
companion animals. In a 2015 Tedx talk, Susan Little, a veterinary 
parasitologist described the effect that successful parasite control 
has had on availability of the human companion animal bond.HO 
In the last twenty years, effective parasite control for pets has 
allowed people to become physically closer to their animals than ever 
before. rn Little claims that effective parasite control has done more 
to support the human animal bond by fundamentally changing the 
proximity and closeness in which people interact with their pets 
than anything else the veterinary medicine profession has done since 
the introduction of the rabies vaccine. n2 Effective parasite control of 
fleas, ticks, and intestinal worms has made household animals 
healthier and more hygienic.ll3 Many of the diseases and infections 
an animal can contract from parasites, like Lyme disease, are 
zoonotic, or shared between animals and humans. ll4 Providing 
evidence of physical closeness with animals, a recent study found 
that over half of pet owners sleep in the same bed as their 
companion animals, and many pet owners derive a sense of comfort 
and security from sleeping in the same bed as their companion 
animals. n5. 
108. Id. 
109. Susan Little, The Human-Animal Bond, TEDX TALKS (Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjxAewIBYJk. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Erica Friedmann & Heesook Son, The Human-Companion Animal Bond: 
How Humans Benefit, 39 VETERINARY CLINICS OF N. AM.: SMALL ANIMAL PRAC. 293, 
293-326 (discussing zoonosis as a potential concern for people coming into contact 
with companion animals and addressing ways to minimize risk of disease and 
infections to vulnerable individuals at health care and long-term care facilities.). 
115. See Lois Krahn, Are Pets in the Bedroom a Problem, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 
1663 (2015); Meghan Holohan, Should Your Pets Sleep in the Bed with You? A New 
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Further, in recent decades, there has been an increasing trend of 
more Americans owning companion animals, and studies show that 
people are spending more money on their animals.116 According to a 
2017-2018 report by American Pet Products Association, 68% of U.S. 
households own a pet, which equates to a pet in 84.6 million 
American homes. 117 This survey illustrates a 21 % increase in the 
number of American households that own pets since the first year 
the survey was conducted in 1988.118 The increase in companion 
animal ownership in the U.S. demonstrates the affinity people have 
towards companion animals. 
Perhaps even more telling is the increase in overall spending on 
companion animals in recent years. In 1994, Americans spent 17 
billion dollars on companion animals; by 2004, that number had 
doubled to 34 billion dollars.119 In 2015, Americans spent a 
staggering 60 billion dollars on companion animals.120 These 
numbers reflect the aggregate annual spending of U.S. owners of 
companion animals on food, supplies, vet care, and live animal 
purchases.121 These trends support the increased value people place 
on companion animals. 
The increased affinities Americans have for their companion 
animals have caused an increase in the academic and scientific 
study of how people interact, live, and are impacted by companion 
animals. The scientific community refers to this area of study as the 
human-companion animal bond.122 The most common framework for 
researching the dimensions of the human companion animal bond is 
Bowlby's Theory of Attachment.123 Bowlby's Theory of Attachment 
uses anxiety and avoidance as gauges of how people interact with 
each other in response to various circumstances to determine the 
Study's Surprising Answers, TODAY (Sept. 12, 2017, 9:56 AM), http://www.today. 
com/health/should-your-pets-sleep-bed-you-new-studys-surprising-answers-t61266. 
116. Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics; AM. PET PRODS. AsS'N, 
http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp (last visit.ed Feb. 10, 
2017). 
117. Id. 
118. Facts + Statistics: Pet Statistics, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.iii.org/fact-statistidpet-statistics (last visit.ed Sept. 23, 2017). 
119. Pet Industry Market Size, supra not.e 116. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. David C. Anderson, The Human-Companion Animal &nd, 41 THE 
REFERENCE LIBRARIAN 7, 8 (2004). 
123. &e generally Marga Vicedo, The Social Nature of the Mother's Tie to Her 
Child: John &wlby's Theory of Attachment in Post-War America, 44 BRITISH J. FOR 
THE HIST. OF SCIENCE 401 (2011). 
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degree of bonding, attachment, and reliance a person has on 
another, or, in this case, on a companion animal.124 Using Bowlby's 
Attachment Theory, the scientific community has found that people 
bond with their companion animals in a similar manner as with 
human family members.125 The human companion animal bond has 
been observed to have positive effects on the physical, social, and 
emotional well-being of the humans.126 
The strongest areas of research evidence demonstrating the 
human companion-animal bond are the positive health benefits of 
pet ownership.127 Pet ownership has been consistently correlated 
with positive physiological measures, such as lower blood pressure, 
serum triglycerides, and cholesterol levels.12s "[T]he presence of a pet 
was found to be more effective than a spouse or friend in 
ameliorating the cardiovascular effects of stress."129 "Interactions 
with companion animals increase neurochemicals associated with 
relaxation and bonding and improves human immune system 
functioning."130 "Overall, a broad range of investigations have found 
that animal-human interactions reduce anxiety, depression, and 
loneliness, as they enhance social support and general well-being."131 
A large study conducted in Germany and Australia spanning two 
decades with a sample size of over 10,000 people found that 
continuous pet owners were the healthiest group of people.132 The 
study found the positive health benefits of pet ownership remained 
significant after controlling for a variety of variables associated with 
health, such as gender, age, marital status, and income.133 The study 
also found that people who no longer had a pet or never had one 
were the least healthy groups ofpeople.134 
In addition to the positive physiological effects of companion 
animal ownership, a wealth of studies also demonstrates positive 
psychophysiological and psychosocial effects of human-animal 
124. Id. at 407. 
125. Elyssa Payne & Paul Bennett, Current Perspectives on Attachment and 
Bonding in the Dog-Human Dyad, 8 PSYCHOL. RES. BEHAV. MGMT. 71, 71-72 (2015). 
126. Id. at 76. 
127. Froma Walsh, Human-Animal Bonds L· The Relational Significance of 
Companion Animals, 48 FAM. PROCESS 462, 466 (2009). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 467. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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interactions.135 Companion animals provide owners with social 
attention, interpersonal interactions, and elevated mood.136 Positive 
stress-related parameters such as lower cortisol and decreased heart 
rate and blood pressure have been scientifically measured and 
positively correlated with companion animal ownership.137 
Additionally, qualitative studies of companion animal owners report 
positive effects on fear, anxiety, depression, and well-being from 
ownership of a dog or cat.138 A significant number of studies have 
replicated the positive effects that interactions with companion 
animals have on blood pressure and heart rate for more than thirty 
years.139 
Further, a significant body of scientific literature describes the 
positive effects of companion animals on people's hormonal 
indicators and neurotransmitters.140 These studies provide direct 
evidence that interactions with a companion animal positively affect 
endocrine responses as indicated by changes in the levels of cortisol, 
epinephrine and norepinephrine.111 This evidence scientifically 
demonstrates the widely supported conclusion that human 
interactions with companion animals have a positive influence on 
human stress responses. Decreased stress during an interaction with 
another living being indicates bonding and is closely related with 
both the anxiety and avoidance prongs of Bowlby's Attachment 
Theory. 
The mounting scientific evidence and literature have prompted 
the medical, psychology, and counseling fields to utilize the positive 
effects of interactions with companion animals by implementing . 
animal assisted therapy to help patients deal with depression and 
anxiety.142 Animal assisted therapy is increasingly utilized in 
nursing homes to provide companionship, security, and comfort for 
elderly people, and many college campuses provide therapy dogs 
outside the classrooms during finals week to help reduce students' 
135. See, e.g., Andrea Beetz et al., Psyclwsocial and Psychophysiological Effects 
of Human-Animal Interactions: The Possible Role of Oxytocin, 3 FRONTIERS 
PSYCHOL. 234 (2012). 
136. Id. at 235. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 236-39. 
140. Id. at 240. 
141. Id. 
142. &e Sandra Barker et al., Effects of Animal-Assisted Therapy on Patients' 
Anxiety, Fear and Depression Before ECT, 19 J. OF ECT 38, 39 (2003) (demonstrating 
that 77% of participants responded that the therapy dog lessened their anxiety, 55% 
had lessened depression, and 55% had reduced fear). 
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anxiety and stress levels. 143 The application for animal-assisted 
therapy is a continually growing arena that includes time with a 
professional counselor and a therapy animal, the presence of therapy 
animals in schools to help children socialize and interact, and 
therapy animals to put children at ease during forensic interviews 
regarding sexual abuse.144 
The majority of studies measuring the physiological, 
psychophysiological, and psychosocial benefits associated with 
companion animals examine human-animal interaction rather than 
companion-animal ownership.145 Although many of these findings 
are the same bonding hallmarks exhibited in positive relationships 
between people, the research arguably demonstrates positive health 
benefits of being around animals rather than the existence of a bond 
or relationship with that animal. However, in addition to the 
research using the Bowlby's Attachment Theory of human bonding 
to show a human companion animal bond, elevated oxytocin and 
dopamine releases in humans provide empirical evidence that people 
form social bonds with their companion animals.146 
The Peptide hormone oxytocin is the primary neurochemical 
associated with human affiliation and bonding. 147 Oxytocin is 
released in the hypothalamus and creates a neurochemical response 
that is associated with affiliation, attachment, and love.148 The 
largest natural releases of oxytocin occur during child birth and 
sexual intercourse.149 Oxytocin is also released in smaller quantities 
when humans hug, kiss, and look into each other's eyes; 
consequently, oxytocin is often referred to as the "cuddle 
chemical."150 From an evolutionary stand point, oxytocin has been 
invaluable to humans as a means to encourage procreation and care 
of children, friends, and partners. Dopamine is a chemical that is 
also released during intimate contact, exercise, and eating. It is most 
often associated as the reward output for activities that are 
biologically and evolutionarily valued. 
143. See Melinda Stanley-Hermanns & Julie Miller, Animal-Assisted Therapy, 
102 AM. J. OF NURSING 69, 71 (2002). 
144. Tori Rodriquez, Animal-Assisted Therapy Linked to Psychological Benefits, 
PSYCHIATRY ADVISOR (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.psychiatryadvisor.com/ 
therapies/animals-therapy-psychological-mental-health-benefits-depression-anxiety-
ptsd/article/473330. 
145. See, e.g., Beetz, supra not;e 135 at 235. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 244. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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Numerous studies have been conducted to document the increase 
of plasma oxytocin levels in humans after petting and close 
proximity with companion animals.151 Interestingly, studies 
conducted tests using unfamiliar dogs and then again with the test 
subject's own dog, and plasma oxytocin levels rose significantly 
higher with a person's own dog.152 "This indicated that the increase 
in [oxytocin] depends on the quality of the human-animal 
relationship-the closer the relationship, the more oxytocin is 
released."153 The same reaction also occurs with releases in response 
to the closeness of relationships between people; the hypothalamus 
releases more oxytocin when greeting a daughter than a good 
friend.154 
Additionally, significant prolactin, phenyl acetic acid, and 
dopamine increases have been documented with interactions 
between people and their pets.155 The increase of these 
neurochemicals and oxytocin has been measured in both people and 
their dogs during and shortly after interactions.156 The fact that dogs. 
have corresponding changes in the same neurochemicals provides 
support for an inference that reciprocal bonding takes place in a 
companion animal's brain.157 Given that dogs have been selectively 
bred for thousands of years to be human companions, this evidence 
is not entirely surprising. Empirical evidence of oxytocin and 
dopamine positively associated with ownership of companion 
animals, along with the physical benefits and self-reports of pet. 
owners, supports the conclusion that a real and significant bond can 
exist between people and their companion animals. 
As described above, a relationship with a companion animal has 
numerous health benefits and is accompanied by the neurochemical 
markers of attachment and social bonding, but the most profound 
evidence for pet owners' emotional attachment to their companion 
animals occurs after the death of their animal. According to Loren 
King and Paul Werner, "It has been demonstrated that the impact 
on physical and emotional well-being from the death of a companion 
animal can be substantial. In this regard it has been consistently 
found that the degree of bonding to a companion animal that has 
151. Id. at 244-45. 
152. Id. at 244. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
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died is positively correlated with grief-related symptoms."158 Froma 
Walsh adds that "[p ]ets often live their full lives with their human 
companions, and profound bereavement at the loss of a cherished pet 
is normal and commonly as strong as for a significant human 
companion."159 
A 2013 study used Bowlby's Attachment Theory and Kubler-
Ross' Model of Grief to analyze owners' attachments to their 
companion animals and grief after the animals died.160 The findings 
suggested that owners formed true attachment bonds with their 
companion animals.161 The presence of grief was comparable to the 
loss of a human family member, and resolution of the grief was 
similarly influenced by the individual's community and positive 
support systems in the same ways people cope with the death of a 
human member.162 The study concluded the attachment bond 
influenced the grief response after the loss of a pet, and "without 
such bond the grief would simply not exist." 163 These findings have 
been replicated in numerous similar studies.164 
The human-companion animal bond provides people with many 
health, social, and emotional benefits, including companionship, 
security, and love. People should have a right to protect this interest 
by receiving just compensation when their companion animals are 
intentionally killed by another. The law recognizes the value of a 
continually growing multitude of relationships in the claim for loss 
of consortium-including spouses, children, grandchildren, parents, 
and adult children. The most recent addition in 2015 was expanding 
the loss of consortium claim to include same sex couples. 165 In light 
of these expansions, people should be afforded the cause of action of 
animal consortium to protect the interest in the bond they have with 
158. Loren King & Paul Werner, Attachment, Social Support, and Responses 
Following the Death of a Companion Animal, 64 OMEGA 119, 120 (2011). 
159. Walsh, supra note 127, at 471. 
160. Michelle Kay Crossley, Pet Loss and Human Bereavement: A 
Phenomenological Study of the Grieving Process, N.C. STATE REPOSITORY (2013), 
https://repository.lib.ncsu.edu/bitstream/handle/1840.16/8451/etd.pdf?sequence=2. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. See generally Caroline Hewson, Grief for Animal Companions and an 
Approach to Support Their Bereaved Owners, 33 BEREAVEMENT CARE 103 (2014); 
Hellen Kemp, The Lived Experience of Companion-Animal Loss: A Systematic Review 
or Qualitative Studies, 29 ANTimozoos 533 (2016); Bronwen Williams, Experiences 
of Bereavement Following the Death of Animals, 19 MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 29 
(2016). 
165. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2636. 
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their companion animal when someone intentionally kills their dog 
or cat. The acknowledgment of this legal remedy should act as a 
deterrent on those otherwise willing to harm companion animals. 
F. Companion Animals Integrated as Family 
Beyond the science considered above, a number of examples exist 
which show the present extent of the integration of companion 
animals into the family unit. For example, individuals are 
increasingly willing to include their dogs and cats in their wedding 
festivities.166 In a 2016 New York Times article, a wedding 
photographer based in Vermont reported that more than half of the 
weddings at which he works would include a pet.167 One such 
wedding included four of the couple's dogs, and the bride explained, 
''The moment they walked in, I thought, 'My family is here.'"168 At 
another wedding a dog was the ring bearer.169 
Recently not only have companion animals played a role in their 
owner's marriages, but also in their divorces. In Travis v. Murray, a 
New York court held a one-day hearing to determine custody of a dog 
named Joey during a divorce proceeding using the standard of the 
"best [interest] for all concerned."170 Travis v. Murray is an example 
of a court's willingness to revisit legal distinctions to further 
animals' interests and people's interest in animals. For example, in 
Travis v. Murray the court said, "a strict property analysis is neither 
desirable nor appropriate," and "[the pet] is decidedly more than a 
piece of property, material or otherwise."171 The court reasoned that 
"[w]here once a dog was considered a nice accompaniment to .a 
family unit, it is now seen as an actual member of that family, vying 
for importance alongside children."112 Additionally, the court noted 
that "[c]ourts in other states have also had occasion to deviate from 
166. Lois Smith Brady, If Anyone Here Objects to This Union, Bark, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/0l/fashion/weddings/dogs-cats-
and-other-pets-at-weddings.html. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Perry A. Farrell, Awww! Arson Dog Daisy Is Ring Bearer for Ann Arbor 
Couple, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 30, 2017), http://www.freep.com/ story/news/local/ 
michigan/2017/05/30/daisy-dog-lab-ring-bearer-wedding/354414001/ ("She was an 
integral part of the growth of their relationship, and that's why it was important for 
them to have her at the wedding."). 
170. Travis v. Murray, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (Sup. Ct. 2013). 
171. Id. at 628. 
172. Id. at 625. 
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the strict pets-equal-property viewpoint to find that household pets 
have a special status surpassing ordinary personality or chattel."173 
Finally, Vox Media reports that half of all pet owners feel their 
pet is as much a part of the family as any other person; one-third let 
their pet sleep in their bed.174 Perhaps comically, one research study 
asked pet owners: "If a bus was hurtling toward your pet and a 
foreign tourist, which would you save?"175 Forty percent of pet 
owners reported they would save their pet.176 Some research even 
suggests dogs offer more support than humans by: (1) "[p]roviding a 
reliable and lasting relationship;" (2) "[b]eing a better receiver of 
care;" and (3) "[b]eing a better source of companionship.177 The 
author concludes that is why we love our dogs so much, and why we 
grieve so deeply when we lose them.178 
G. Animal within the Legal Context of Family 
There are several fact patterns where our legal system presently 
acknowledges that companion animals are a full member of a family 
and not just cute and fuzzy property of the human family members. 
No member of a court or legislature should be discouraged from 
expanding the visibility and protections for companion animals 
within families, as it is being done in small steps all over the 
country. 
1. Trust and Estates 
The primary example deals with human-created trusts for the 
care of animals, usually companion animals. As a parent wishes to 
provide for their children when they die, so too do human guardians 
wish to provide for their companion animals. It was not possible to 
formally do this until the laws started to change in the 1990s. The 
173. Id. at 627. 
174. Alvin Chang, When My Dog Died, I Didn't Understand Why It Felt like a 
Human Had Died. Then I Read the Research, VOX (July 11, 2016, 8:20 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/2016/7/11/12109786/dog-death-research. 
175. Id. (citing Harold Herzog, Would You Save a Puppy or a Child From A 
Burning Building?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (June 17, 2013), https://works.bepress. 
com/harold-herzog/55n. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. (citing Herzog, supra note 175). 
178. Id. (citing Sheila Bonas, June McNicholas, and Glyn M. Collis, Pets in the 
Network of Family Relationships: An Empirical Study, COMPANION ANlMALS AND 
Us: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND PETS 209 (Anthony L. 
Podberscek, et al., ed. 2005)). 
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drafters of the Uniform Trust Code started the process with the 
drafting of Section 408 of the Model Law. Under this section, a trust 
for the care of an animal is specifically allowed, along with the 
authorization for courts to appoint someone to enforce the trust.179 
Parallel language was subsequently made part of the Uniform 
Probate Code.180 Thus, as a beneficiary of a trust, a companion 
animal becomes a legally visible being, one who can claim equitable 
title in the income and assets of a trust. The companion animal must 
be a specific living being, and the trust cannot include unborn 
offspring of the named companion animal. After the last-named 
animal dies, the funds of the trust are distributed to humans or 
placed in a human-focused trust.181 
The animal beneficiary is a limited legal personhood, going 
beyond animal welfare concerns to actually provide a legally 
protected asset for animal well-being. The result of these provisions 
is that the animal is the functional beneficiary of the trust; 
therefore, jf issues arise, the trustee could be sued by the animal, 
through a court-appointed attorney, to enforce the provisions of the 
179. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000) (last revised and 
amended in 2010). 
Id. 
(a) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during 
the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, 
if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal 
alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving 
animal. 
(b) A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person appointed 
in the terms of the trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person 
appointed by the court. A person having an interest in the welfare of the 
animal may request the court to appoint a person to enforce the trust or to 
remove a person appointed. 
180. Compare id., with UNIF. PROB. CODE§ 2-907(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1969) 
(last revised and amended in 2010). 
Id. 
[A) trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. The 
trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. A governing 
instrument shall be liberally construed to bring the transfer within this 
subsection, to presume against the merely precatory or honorary nature of 
the disposition and to carry out the general intent of the transferor. 
Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the transferor's intent. 
181. See In re Copland, 988 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (Sur. Ct. 2014), for an example of 
a disputed trust, where the court refused to reduce the corpus within the pet trust. 
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trust. As of this writing, every state has enacted a law permitting 
pet trusts.182 
While the trust laws have been changing, the Internal Revenue 
Code has not. As has been pointed out by one tax attorney, in the 
eyes of the Internal Revenue Service, the tax treatment of animal 
trusts is different from any other trust in that, as an animal is not a 
"person," the animal cannot be required to pay income taxes. 
Therefore, income normally taxable to the beneficiary of a trust must 
be handled in other ways.183 It should be noted that each state has 
the opportunity to define which animals may be made part of a trust. 
The scope of the term varies between the states and can be just 
companion animals, or domestic animals, or any animal, which 
would include wildlife. 
2. Restraining Orders 
Another area where companion animals have legal visibility is as 
part of personal restraining orders. In the fall of 2016, the state of 
Alaska modified existing divorce law to allow victims of domestic 
violence to seek a restraining order for protection of property 
including "a pet, regardless of the ownership of those items."184 The 
definition of pet is rather sweeping: "'pet' means a vertebrate living 
creature maintained for companionship or pleasure."185 The new 
provisions also allow a court, in the context of a protection order 
request, to order the payment of funds by the named party for not 
only support for the adult victim and minor children, but also for 
pets in the care of the petitioner.186 So, in this context, the 
companion animal is treated as a child in the eyes of the law. 
As of the end of 2016, a strong majority of thirty-two states had 
protective order provisions that included animals.187 In Wisconsin, 
182. Michigan State University College of Law, Map of States with Companion 
Animal (Pet) Trust Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR., https://www.animallaw. 
info/content/map-states-companion-animal-pet-trust-laws. 
183. Tax Man's Best Friend: An Overview of the Tax Issues Affecting Pet Trust, 
ANIMAL L. SEC. NEWSL. (State Bar Mich.), Summer 2016, at 1. 
184. ALAsKA STAT. §18.65.520(a) (2016). 
185. ALAsKA STAT. §18.65.590(2) (2016). 
186. ALAsKA STAT. §18.66.100(c)(l2) (2016). 
187. &e Rebecca F. Wisch, Domestic Violence and Pets: List of States that 
Include Pets in Protection Orders, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2016), 
https://www.animallaw.info/article/domestic-violence-and-pets-list-states-include-
pets-protection-orders. For example, in Michigan a judge may enter a personal 
protection order to restrain or enjoin a spouse ... from doing 1 or more of the 
following: 
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the scope of protection for animals within a family extends beyond 
just the protection orders, but also includes restraining orders and 
injunctions in child abuse, individual-at-risk, and harassment 
situations.188 
3. Divorce 
The property status of companion animals is also a hindrance to 
their consideration by courts in the context of human divorces.189 
The Alaska law discussed above also allows the relevant court to 
make specific determinations about companion animals in a final 
divorce order: "the court may provide ... for the ownership or joint 
ownership of the animal, taking into consideration the well-being of 
the animal."190 
This statute clearly acknowledges that animals have interests 
independent of the spouses and that animals have legal personalities 
to be considered by the legal system when a divorce proceeding 
impacts their lives. This statute also acknowledges that animals 
within a family are in the conceptual position of children, and courts 
have an independent duty to consider the best outcome for the 
animal in addition to the parties' wishes and property ownership. 
4. Miscellanies of Examples 
Beyond the actions of the legislature, the courts have also, on 
occasion, acknowledged the legal existence of specific animals. For 
example, a guardian was appointed to a chimpanzee for purposes of 
the animal's interests in a trust,191 to a dog for purposes of 
(j) Any of the following with the intent to cause the petitioner mental 
distress or to exert control over the petitioner with respect to an animal in 
which the petitioner has an ownership interest: 
(i) Injuring, killing, torturing, neglecting, or threatening to injure, kill, 
torture, or neglect the animal. 
(ii) Removing the animal from the petitioner's possession. 
(iii) Retaining or obtaining possession of the animal. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2950 (West 2017). 
188. WIS. STAT.§ 813.122(4)(a), (5) (West 2017). 
189. Amy B. Wang, A Divorcing Couple Asked a Judge to Treat Their Dogs like 
Children. Here Is His Reply., WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/animalia/wp/2016/12/21/a-divorcing-couple-asked-a-judge-to-treat-
their-dogs-like-children-here-was-his-reply/?utm_term=. leaf5263a4ea. 
190. ALAsKA STAT. §25.24.160(a)(5) (2016) (emphasis added). 
191. In re Fla. Chimpanwe Care Trust, No. CP-02-1333-IY (Fla. Cir. Ct., Apr. 1, 
2002) (order appointing guardian ad litem) ("It is hereby ordered: 1. [C.S.] is 
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placement,192 and the fifty Michael Vick pit bulls were placed under 
the guardianship of an attorney.193 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
All the information provided above supports the existence of the 
real and important relationship that exists between a human and 
their companion animal. It is time to proceed to the specific 
consideration of how to expand the existing cause of action under 
consortium to encompass companion animals. As consortium is a 
long-standing common law concept, this expansion can be 
accomplished either by the courts or the legislature. 
A. By the Courts 
For a court to adopt the concept of animal consortium, it must 
first believe that there is a real harm which deserves the attention of 
social consideration. While the legal system is most comfortable with 
damages awarded for econ01nic harm, it is beyond dispute that 
economic recovery for non -economic harm is allowed in our 
appointed as guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the beneficiaries of the 
Trust in all future matters involving the Trust; and 2. [C.S.'s] reasonable fees for 
serving as guardian ad litem for the Trust beneficiaries shall be paid from the assets 
of the trust."). 
192. In re Estate of Ronald W. Callan Jr., No. D-2252 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Mar. 20, 
2007) (order appointing guardian ad litem) ("It is therefore Ordered Adjudged and 
Decreed that: 2. The Guardian Ad Litem owes a duty to this Honorable Court to 
impartially investigate and to determine the facts to the Court. The Guardian Ad 
Litem is not an advocate for the dog, but has the duty to determine what is best for 
the dog's welfare."). 
193. Second Order as to Disposition and Appointing Guardian/Special Master at 
2, United States v. Approximately 53 Pit Bull Dogs, No. 3:07CV397 at *2 (E.D. Va. 
Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvick_order_ 
appointing_guardian.pdf. The Order provided that: 
1. Rebecca J. Huss is hereby appointed as guardian/special master to 
consider appropriate options for a final disposition of the remaining 48 
pitbull dogs previously forfeited to the United States. 
2. Professor Huss shall have the following powers and duties to fulfill her 
obligations: 
(a) Consider available disposition and placement options as she deems 
appropriate for the final disposition of the remaining dogs; .... 
Id. See also Motion for Second Order as to Disposition and Appointing 
Guardian/Special Master, United States v. Approximately 53 Pit Bull Dogs, No. 
3:07CV397 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/ 
pbusvick_motion_to_appoint_guardian.pdf. 
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system.194 There are a number of policy reasons why now is the time 
to bring animal consortium under the umbrella to be recognized by 
the courts. Smaller family sizes and the exploding popularity of pets 
have made companion animals important emotional components in 
the daily lives of millions of Americans. 195 Those persons who invade 
this family core and intentionally kill a member should be subject to 
civil damages beyond the property value of the animal. 
Is it fair to put this risk of punishment on defendant actors? If an 
actor kills a human family member, then they will be liable both in 
criminal law and in civil law under existing definitions of 
consortium. That society has already judged that the intentional, 
unjustified killing of an animal can result in a felony conviction in 
criminal courts out of concern for the lives of the animals 
themselves, it is time to also allow for the civil recovery for the 
family members harmed by the intentional acts of the defendant. 
The risk of punishment is a fair burden to put on individuals 
because, in today's world, if someone kills a dog or cat, it is 
foreseeable that the animal was a part of someone's family, and 
society values and protects this family relationship.196 To prove that 
the defendant actor should be liable under loss of consortium, the 
first element should be that the actor intended to harm a companion 
animal. The second element should be that the animal must die as a 
result of the actor's harm. While injury of a companion animal may 
well cause pain and suffering to the human family members, the 
bond is still present and functional as long as the companion animal 
is alive. The death of an animal provides certainty of a severance of 
the bond. Additionally, the third element should be that the plaintiff 
must prove the existence and extent of the bond between the human 
and the companion animal. The bond must be more than the fact 
that the human and the animal co-inhabited the same dwelling. As 
discussed in Part II.b., the New Mexico Supreme Court has set out a 
list of factors that are appropriate to use in this circumstance.197 
Over time, the courts have expanded the availability of 
consortium by expanding the definition of who is within a family.198 
In order to limit slippery slope arguments, the courts should be able 
194. See generally Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for Nonmonetary Losses: An 
Integrated Answer to the Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation of 
Noneconomic Damages, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (2009) (discussing the validity of 
non-economic damages and arguing for a rational way to calculate them). 
195. Payne, supra note 125, at 76. 
196. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 166. 
197. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
198. See Fernandez, 968 P.2d at 782. 
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to limit this extension of consortium by the species of the animal. 
Both by practice and by support of empirical studies, the emotional 
bond being discussed in this article can be limited to domestic dogs 
and cats.199 There is no reason why a court could not limit the 
extension of the consortium claim to these two species of animals at 
this time. Intentional acts of harm most often occur against these 
two species. Accordingly, no cause of action should exist for the 
intentional killing of a goldfish or a lizard. 
One other troubling issue should be mentioned: runaway jury 
awards. Putting a monetary value on noneconomic damages is an 
inherent difficulty for plaintiff attorneys and juries. One author did 
an economic analysis which suggested the top amount of monetary 
recovery for loss of an animal would be in the range of $25,000.200 
While real harm has been done and some level of economic 
punishment is appropriate, noneconomic awards can sometimes 
become excessive. Under the general powers of the courts, excessive 
jury awards can be controlled.201 
B. Existing Legislation 
If the courts of a particular state are unwilling to allow animal 
consortium, then the legislative route is possible. Indeed, as of 2016, 
five states have adopted modest laws that provide some level of 
damages beyond market value for injury or death of animals.202 
However, their provisions are diverse, and there is no attempt to tie 
into the concepts of consortium. Table 1 provides some side-by-side 
comparisons of the provisions from the five states. 
199. See infra Table 1 in Part III.b .. 
200. See Sebastien Gay, Companion Animal Capital, 17 ANIMAL L. 77, 90-91 
(2010), for one economic analysis, including formulas that this author is not capable 
of following. 
201. See, e.g., Turner v. Lyons, 867 So.2d 13, 26 (La. Ct. App., 2004) (allowing 
children to recover for loss of consortium and reducing an excessive jury award from 
$150,000 to $50,000.). 
202. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-35l(a) (West 2017); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
§ 70/16.3 (West 2017); Mo. CODE ANN. CTS. &JUD. PROC.§ 11-110 (LexisNexis 2013); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.740 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(l) (2016). See 
Byszewski, supra note 9, at 225-30, for a discussion on the history of several of these 
statutes. 
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Table 1 
Provisions Illinois Maaland Connecticut Tennessee Nevada 
20:J 204 205 206 207 
Which Domestic Household Household Household 
animal? An animal animal, not dog or cat dog or cat dog or cat livestock 
Which )wnership in Owner of Owner of Natural 
companion A person human? animal pet 
animal person 
Aggravated Unlawfully ntentionally, 
cruelty & Tortiously ntentionally and recklessly or Which tl causes ntentionally 
action? torture injury or kills or negligently 
.hat injures injures or injures 
or kills death208 negligently or kills kills209 
Veterinary Veterinary 
cost; other Veterinary cost; 
expenses; cost; Non- burial; and Damages emotional Veterinary burial cost; 
economic attorney 
allowed? distress; care attorney 210 fees; 
attorney fees; and Excludes 
fees; and punitive noneconomic 
punitive and punitive 
Punitive Compensa- Non-damages tory Punitive economic Total award 
Maximum shall be damages damages damages not to 
award $500 to not to limited to a not to exceed $25,000 for 
exceed judicial exceed $5,000 
each act of $7,500 ceiling $5,000211 
crueltv 
203. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 70/16.3 (West 2017). 
204. Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc.§ 11-110 (LexisNexis 2013). 
205. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 22-351(a) (West 2017). One court reflected on this 
new statute and stated that "the legislature has also acknowledged that a household 
pet such as Shadow holds with a distinct, identifiable and legally protected place 
within the human family unit." Vaneck, 2009 WL 1333918, at *4. 
206. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 44-17-403(a)(l) (2016). 
207. NEV. REV. STAT.§ 41.740 (2015). 
208. Harm may also be "through an animal under the person's direction or 
control." MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC.§ 11-110 (LexisNexis 2013). 
209. Statute also specifically includes harm by the "animal of another." TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(a)(l) (2016). If the harm is caused by the negligence of the 
other pet owner, the incident must have occurred on the property of the owner or 
when the animal was under the control of the owner. Id. 
210. Defined as "reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection 
of the pet." TENN. CODE ANN.§ 44-17-403(d) (2016). 
211. Professional negligence against a veterinarian is specifically excluded from 
allowing noneconomic damages. Id. 
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As seen in the table above, four out of five states limit the species 
of companion animals to dogs and cats; all five states identify the 
possible plaintiff as "owner," but the term is never defined in the 
family setting; four of the five states allow statutory recovery for 
injury of a companion animal; all five states allow statutory recovery 
for death of a companion animal; all five states apply to intentional 
torts, with two states also allowing recovery for negligence; four of 
the five specifically allow reasonable veterinary cost; three of the five 
states allow reasonable attorney fees; Tennessee is the only state 
allowing compensation for "expected society, companionship, love 
and affection of the pet;"212 Illinois allows for emotional distress; all 
five have some limitation on the amount of the award, although 
different categories are capped in different states.213 While these 
statutes are helpful in allowing a plaintiff more than property value 
for the harm to a companion animal, four of the statutes do not 
acknowledge the long-term loss of a family member as contemplated 
under this article's animal consortium proposal.214 
C. Amending an Existing Consortium Statute 
State statutes dealing with civil claims of consortium vary 
greatly in comprehensiveness and clarity. This article does not seek 
to analyze these differences; instead, it seeks to show how animal 
consortium can be inserted into such statutes. Our reference point 
will be the Florida statute,215 which is well organized and 
comprehensive. The Florida statute does not cover injury to a family 
member, only the consequences that flow from the death of a family 
member.216 As this article is asserting a cause of action only when 
the companion animal dies, this limitation is acceptable. 
There are several aspects of the statute that are important to note. 
First, wrongful death is separate from claims of loss of consortium and 
is set out in section 1 of the act.211 Second, section 2 has two distinct 
categories of non-economic damages for the surviving spouse: 
"companionship and protection," and "pain and suffering."21s The first 
category can be thought of as the long-term claim of loss of society and 
companionship, part of a traditional loss of consortium claim. The 
second category refers to the negative, immediate consequences of the 
212. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 44-17-403(d) (2016). 
213. See supra, Table 1 in Part IV.b .. 
214. Id. 
215. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West 2017) (fully set out in Appendix A). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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wrongful act when emotionally dealing with the harm to a loved one.219 
Third, minor children also receive two categories of damages in section 
3 for loss of a parent.220 Finally, parents may recover for loss of a child, 
but, in this case, the category of damages is denoted as "mental pain 
and suffering."221 Curiously, loss of companionship is not provided for 
the parent when a child is loss.222 
It would be relatively easy to amend this statute to allow an 
action for companion animals. Bracketed language is provided as 
optional language: 
(Sec.3a) For the intentional harm of a companion animal that 
results in the death of the animal, surviving intimate family 
members may recover for loss of companionship and the 
mental pain and suffering associated with the death. 
Companion animals are defined as the domestic species of 
dogs and cats that live their daily lives as part of the family. 
[There can be only one action filed for each deceased 
companion animal.] [The total recovery for an action under 
this section shall not exceed [$50,000].][Intimate family 
members are those who interacted with the animal on a 
regular basis so as to form an emotional bond with the 
animal.] [Damages for loss of companionship shall relate to 
the strength of the bond with the deceased which existed at 
the time of the harm to the companion animal.] 
The bracketed language is suggested as confining language which will 
limit attempts to abuse the process and avoid runaway jury awards. 
CONCLUSION 
The loss of consortium doctrine is the ideal mechanism for 
addressing civil damages for the intentional killing of a companion 
animal in terms of history, malleability, and application. It is worth 
reiterating that the early history of consortium actions evidence that 
a companion animal's legal status as property is not a barrier to 
recovery under consortium. Married women were the property of 
their husbands, before the Married Women's Property Acts, and loss 
219. See Joellen Lind, Valuing Relationships: the Role of Damages for Loss of 
Society, 35 NEW MEX. L. REV. 301 (2005), for an excellent discussion of these non-
economic damages. 
220. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21(3) (West 2017). 
221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21(4) (West 2017). 
222. &e id. 
930 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84.893 
of consortium claims already granted compensation for loss of 
companionship to their husbands before the legal status of married 
women changed.223 Additionally, the law already allows juries to 
quantify the damages for loss of certain family members, such as 
husbands, wives, children, grandparents, adult children, and even 
siblings in some jurisdictions.224 The umbrella of relationships 
covered by consortium has been expanding for the last one hundred 
years.225 Dogs and cats can fit comfortably under the consortium 
umbrella of intimate family members. Finally, animal consortium 
provides a ready answer to the very real problem that a person can 
intentionally and violently kill someone's companion animal and 
only owe the owner the nominal replacement cost of a new pet. 
The law has started to recognize the special interest people place 
in their companion animals. These changes can be seen in the 
Uniform Probate Code allowing pet trusts, 226 restraining orders 
protecting victims and their pets,227 and divorce proceedings 
considering the best interest of all concerned for companion animal 
custody.22s Pets are truly a key fountain of emotional support, love, 
and friendship for family members. Science has empirically proven 
the human-companion animal bond exists by neurochemical data 
showing increases of dopamine and oxytocin with people and their 
pets, and positive physiological responses of heart rate, blood 
pressure, and triglycerides.229 This proposal does not seek to give 
any legal rights to companion animals; instead, this article calls for 
the law to acknowledge the depth and reality of the bond between 
humans and animals that exists in millions of families across the 
land and to substantiate the pain and loss that occurs when a pet is 
violently torn from a family's life. 
Judges have the power to adapt the common law by expanding the 
loss of consortium doctrine to address the issue of appropriate damages 
for intentionally killing a person's pet. Just as judges can empower 
juries to value lost relationships, legislatures may do the same by 
codifying the common law with the adaptions suggested above. For all 
of the above reasons, a cause of action for animal consortium under the 
loss of consortium doctrine should be made available to any owner 
whose companion animal is intentionally killed. 
223. See supra notes 114, 88-91 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text. 
225. See discussion supra in Part III.a .. 
226. See discussion supra in Part III.g.1.. 
227. See discussion supra in Part III.g.2. 
228. See discussion supra in Part III.g.3. 
229. See discussion supra in Part III.e .. 
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APPENDIX A 
Effective: September 15, 2003 
West's F.S.A. § 768.21 
768.21. Damages 
931 
All potential beneficiaries of a recovery for wrongful death, 
including the decedent's estate, shall be identified in the complaint, 
and their relationships to the decedent shall be alleged. Damages 
may be awarded as follows: 
(1) Each survivor may recover the value of lost support and 
services from the date of the decedent's injury to her or his death, 
with interest, and future loss of support and services from the date 
of death and reduced to present value. In evaluating loss of support 
and services, the survivor's relationship to the decedent, the amount 
of the decedent's probable net income available for distribution to 
the particular survivor, and the replacement value of the decedent's 
services to the survivor may be considered. In computing the 
duration of future losses, the joint life expectancies of the survivor 
and the decedent and the period of minority, in the case of healthy 
minor children, may be considered. 
(2) The surviving spouse may also recover for loss of the 
decedent's companionship and protection and for mental pain and 
suffering from the date of injury. 
(3) Minor children of the decedent, and all children of the 
decedent if there is no surviving spouse, may also recover for lost 
parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental 
pain and suffering from the date of injury. For the purposes of this 
subsection, if both spouses die within 30 days of one another as a 
result of the same wrongful act or series of acts arising out of the 
same incident, each spouse is considered to have been predeceased 
by the other. 
( 4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may also recover for 
mental pain and suffering from the date of injury. Each parent of an 
adult child may also recover for mental pain and suffering if there 
are no other survivors. 
(5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's injury or 
death may be recovered by a survivor who has paid them. 
(6) The decedent's personal representative may recover for the 
decedent's estate the following: 
(a) Loss of earnings of the deceased from the date of injury to the 
date of death, less lost support of survivors excluding 
contributions in kind, with interest. Loss of the prospective net 
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accumulations of an estate, which might reasonably have been 
expected but for the wrongful death, reduced to present money 
value, may also be recovered: 
1. If the decedent's survivors include a surviving spouse or 
lineal descendants; or 
2. If the decedent is not a minor child as defined in§ 
768.18(2), there are no lost support and services recoverable 
under subsection (1), and there is a surviving parent. 
(b) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's injury or 
death that have become a charge against her or his estate or that 
were paid by or on behalf of decedent, excluding amounts 
recoverable under subsection (5). 
(c) Evidence of remarriage of the decedent's spouse is admissible. 
(7) All awards for the decedent's estate are subject to the claims 
of creditors who have complied with the requirements of probate law 
concerning claims. 
(8) The damages specified in subsection (3) shall not be 
recoverable by adult children and the damages specified in 
subsection (4) shall not be recoverable by parents of an adult child 
with respect to claims for medical negligence as defined by § 
766.106(1). 
